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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
INTERPRETING THE TITLE I REGULATIONS:
THE HARD CASES
Bonnie P. Tuckert
INTRODUCTION
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA or
the Act)' addresses and makes illegal certain discrimination in
the workplace based on real or perceived disabilities. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC), in compli-
ance with the ADA's mandate to implement Title I,' has issued
regulations' and interpretive guidance with respect to the
employment provisions of the Act.' The EEOC's regulations
are, for the most part, thoughtful and comprehensive. The
regulations are largely premised on regulations and case law
developed over more than a decade under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, particularly sections 504 and 501. The EEOC is to be
t Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law. B.S. Syracuse
University; J.D. University of Colorado. Author of, with B. Goldstein, Legal
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: An Analysis of Federal Law. This article
was adapted from a speech given March 28, 1992 at the Symposium, Enabling
the Workplace: Will the Americans with Disabilities Act Meet the Challenge?
sponsored by the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy.
1 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. II
1991). Title I is codified as Subchapter I and is found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-
17 (Supp. II 1991).
2 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (Supp. 1H 1991).
' Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-1630.16 (1992).
4 Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
29 C.F.R. app. pt. 1630 (1992).
' Equal Employment Opportunity For Individuals With Disabilities, 56
Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991) (final Title I regulations, guidance, and explanatory
section). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 54-83,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 336-366; The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988). Section 504 of the Act prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability by: (1) recipients of federal financial
assistance with respect to employment and the provision of programs and
services; and (2) federal executive agencies with respect to the provision of
programs and services. 29 U.S.C. § 794. Section 501 requires federal agencies
to affirmatively seek to hire persons with disabilities, and to refrain from
discriminating on the basis of disability in matters of employment. 29 U.S.C.
§ 791.
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commended for its substantial efforts in attempting to address
the significant employment issues that may arise under the
ADA. Given the gargantuan nature of that task, however, it is
not surprising that the regulations contain grey areas, and that
unresolved questions remain.
This article will present six hypothetical case scenarios
designed to (1) illustrate pitfalls that might arise under the
ADA regulations, and (2) address potential interpretive dilem-
mas. In a few instances the author will venture an educated
guess as to the manner in which the courts are likely to resolve
issues raised, but the author assumes no responsibility for what
happens in real life!
I. DRIVING ACROSS THE SUBSTANTIALLY
LIMITED THRESHOLD
Joe Smith applies for a job driving a garbage truck in the
city in which he resides. He is conditionally hired for the job,
pending the results of a post-offer, pre-employment medical
exam. During the medical exam, Joe acknowledges that he has
experienced occasional mild seizures during his lifetime. Joe
explains that he has tested negatively for epilepsy and other
seizure disorders, and that doctors have attributed his seizures
to hyperventilation during periods of extreme stress or fear. Joe
also states that he has not had any seizures in over five years.
He is again given an electroencephalogram (EEG) which con-
firms that he does not have epilepsy. The city nonetheless
refuses to hire Joe in accord with its policy which prohibits
hiring to drive city vehicles an individual with any record of
seizures. The policy reflects the city's fear that an individual
will have a seizure while driving. Joe files an action under Title
I of the ADA claiming discrimination on the basis of either an
actual or perceived disability.
The threshold issue is whether Joe is protected under the
ADA. Is he disabled within the meaning of Title I? It is not
enough that Joe's history of mild seizures constitutes or is
regarded as a physical impairment. Under the ADA, Joe is only
covered if he has a physical or mental impairment - actual or
perceived - that substantially limits one or more of his major
life activities.6 "Major life activities" under the Act include
functions such as "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
6 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. II 1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
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walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working."7  Assuming Joe's infrequent mild seizures do not
interfere with any of his other everyday activities, the only way
Joe falls within the protection of the ADA is if he is substantial-
ly limited in his ability to work.' Joe's status must be deter-
mined before his action under the ADA can proceed.
The Title I regulations provide that, with respect to the
major life activity of working, the term "substantially limits"
means:
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either
a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various class-
es as compared to the average person having compara-
ble training, skills and abilities. The inability to per-
form a single, particular job does not constitute a sub-
stantial limitation in the major life activity of work-
ing.
9
The regulations suggest that three factors be considered when
evaluating whether Joe's major life activity of working is sub-
stantially limited:
(A) The geographical area to which [Joe] has reason-
able access;
(B) The job from which [Joe] has been disqualified
because of an impairment, and the number and types of
jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, -skills or
abilities, within that geographical area, from which
[Joe] is also disqualified because of the impairment
(class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which [Joe] has been disqualified
because of an impairment, and the number and types of
other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from
7 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
8 See 29 C.F.R. app. §1630.2(j), which provides that "[if an individual is
not substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity, the
individual's ability to perform the major life activity of working should be
considered."
9 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3).
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which [Joe] is also disqualified because of the impair-
ment (broad range of jobs in various classes).'0
Under this regulation, the fewer alternative job opportunities
Joe has, the more likely his major life activity of working will be
substantially limited.
Before Joe can get to the merits of his claim, therefore, he
will have to spend time and money identifying similar and
dissimilar jobs within a reasonably accessible geographical area
from which he would be disqualified." Although the interpre-
tive guidelines to the regulations provide that an "onerous
evidentiary showing" is not required, 2 Joe will be required to
present "evidence of general employment demographics and/or
of recognized occupational classifications that indicate the
appropriate number of jobs" from which Joe would be excluded
due to his seizure history. 3 Even that "non-onerous" eviden-
tiary showing may involve costly and time-consuming investiga-
tion and analysis.
Moreover, the regulations are ambiguous with respect to
what other employers and jobs are to be considered in this
analysis. Should Joe assume that other employers who hire
drivers, such as neighboring cities that hire garbage truck
drivers, would also refuse to hire Joe? Or, are such employers
to be viewed as employers from whom Joe might obtain employ-
ment despite his seizure history?
The EEOC's initial proposed regulations contained a proviso
stating that, when determining whether an individual is regard-
ed as substantially limited in the ability to work, "it should be
assumed that all similar employers would apply the same
exclusionary standard that the employer charged with discrimi-
nation has used.' 1
4
That proviso was deleted from the final regulations.'5
10 Id.
" This determination, preliminary to determining whether an individual
is "disabled" due to a substantial limitation in the ability to work, is purely a
creation of the EEOC; it is not supported in the ADA itself or the legislative
history to the Act.
2 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
13 Id.
" Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities; Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (1991).
15 See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,728 (1991) (section-by-section analysis of comments
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Under the final version, the "regarded as" prong of the defini-
tion of "disability" is satisfied if the plaintiff can show that the
employer made a decision "because of a perception of disability
based on 'myth, fear or stereotype."'16 The effect of this change
is unclear.
A good argument can be made that Joe is "disabled" if the
city's refusal to hire him is based on a myth or stereotype about
his seizures, regardless of the extent to which Joe is precluded
from obtaining other jobs. The city has either misclassified Joe
as having a disability or regards Joe as having a disability
based on stereotypes when he is not, in fact, disabled. This
argument is in accord with the legislative history of the ADA,
which indicates that Congress intended that a rejection from
one particular job based on the fact that the employer regarded
an individual as disabled would constitute discriminatory
conduct under Title I. The House Judiciary Report notes that:
a person who is rejected from a job because of the
myths, fears and stereotypes associated with disabili-
ties would be covered under [the "regarded as"] test,
whether or not the employer's perception is shared by
others in the field and whether or not the person's
physical or mental condition would be considered a
disability under the first or second part of the defini-
tion. 17
That report further states:
In the employment context, if a person is disqualified
on the basis of an actual or perceived physical or men-
tal condition, and the employer can articulate no legiti-
mate job-related reason for the rejection, a perceived
concern about employing persons with disabilities could
be inferred and the plaintiff would qualify for coverage
under the "regarded as" test ... .'8
and revisions to the proposed regulations).
16 Id.
17 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess., pt. 3, at 30 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 30-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 453.
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The EEOC's regulations, however, do not resolve the issue
in this manner. Rather, the regulations focus on the effect of
the classification, the substantial limitation of the ability to
work, looking to the number of jobs from which Joe is precluded
due to the employer's attitude. Under the EEOC's regulations,
therefore, an analysis of other job opportunities will probably be
required. Another question thus arises: when making that
analysis, do we count employers having the same types of jobs
in our examination of jobs from which Joe would be excluded?
This question remains unanswered in the EEOC's regulations.
It is clear, however, that in the likely event that an eviden-
tiary showing is necessary, whether Joe can pursue his action
under the ADA will depend upon where he lives. If he lives in
a major city, for example, he may not be covered under Title I,
because there are a variety of other jobs, besides driving a
garbage truck for the city, that he could obtain with his educa-
tion and credentials despite his seizure history. If, however, he
lives in a small town, he may be covered under the ADA be-
cause of the smaller number of other jobs available in that area.
Under the Title I regulations, where two people have identical
physical characteristics but live in different locations, one may
be held "disabled" and thus covered under the ADA and the
other may not. Aside from leading to incongruous results, this
provision allows employers in metropolitan areas to engage in
conduct that may be held discriminatory when engaged in by
employers in less populated areas.
II. CHECKING SEVERAL ISSUES
John Brown is a professional hockey player with the New
York Swingers. He is injured in a car accident and loses a
kidney. Otherwise, he recovers completely. After the accident,
the owner of the Swingers, Kathy Baldwin, tells John that she
is releasing him from the team for his own safety. Hockey is a
rough game, and the likelihood that John could be hit in the
kidney area by a puck, hockey stick, or another player is great.
The possibility that John could injure his sole remaining kidney
- and die as a result - worries her. Kathy offers, however, to
hire John as one of the team's four assistant coaches.
John refuses to leave the team. He explains that he fully
understands the risk to his safety if he continues to play hockey.
Playing hockey is the most important thing in his life and,
having weighed the pros and cons, worth whatever risk he
might face. John has no interest in coaching; he likes to play,
1992] ADA TITLE I REGULATIONS: THE HARD CASES 7
not devise strategy. Moreover, the salary of an assistant coach
is considerably less than the salary of a good hockey player.
Kathy refuses to back down and releases him from the team.
John files suit under the ADA.
This hypothetical case raises several questions: Is John
disabled within the meaning of the Act? What is the scope of
the safety defense? And, how broad is the employer's obligation
to reassign an employee with a disability?
A. DISABLED UNDER THE ADA?
As with the previous case, the threshold determination is
whether John is disabled within the meaning of Title I and thus
covered by the Act. Since John's loss of a kidney has not sub-
stantially limited any of his daily life activities, John is only
covered if he is substantially limited in his ability to work. Is
John "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA because Kathy
prohibits him from playing hockey?
Two examples from the interpretive guidelines to the Title
I regulations suggest not. The first example involves a pilot
who is refused employment as a commercial airline pilot be-
cause he has a minor vision problem, but who could be em-
ployed as a commercial airline co-pilot or as a pilot for a courier
service.19 The second involves a professional baseball pitcher
who develops a bad elbow and can no longer throw a
baseball.2" According to the guidelines, neither individual is
"substantially limited in the major life activity of working,"
because both "are only unable to perform either a particular
specialized job or a narrow range of jobs." 1 Under this inter-
pretation, John would not be covered under Title I because he is
only precluded from performing a particular specialized job -
playing hockey.
Since John has no disability that would actually impair his
ability to play hockey, but rather his employer merely considers
him as having an impairment, his situation should be analyzed
under the "regarded as" prong of the definition of a disabled
person." The EEOC's narrow interpretation of "major life
activity" appears to eviscerate this prong. Under the EEOC's
19 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
20 Id.
21 Id.
2 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3).
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regulatory interpretation, employers may be free to discriminate
at will when the result would be to preclude individuals from
working in only a specialized or narrow class of jobs.
Suppose, for example, that John was not a hockey player,
but a litigation attorney whose law firm fired John "for his own
good" based on the purely mythical belief that a person with one
kidney should not stand on his feet in the courtroom for long
periods of time or engage in frequent stressful travel. Because
John has been precluded from working only as a litigation
attorney - a specialized job under the EEOC's interpretation of
the regulations - the law firm may discriminate against John
with impunity.23 A more logical interpretation would be that
John falls within the statutory definition of a disabled person
because his employer regards him as being substantially limited
in his ability to work at his chosen career, for which he has
trained for many years, when in fact he is not so limited. In the
EEOC's view, however, this interpretation is incorrect.24
B. SAFETY DEFENSE
Assuming, arguendo, that John meets the definition of a
disabled person, a more significant question arises. Does Kathy
violate Title I by firing John for his own safety? Title I of the
ADA provides employers with a "safety defense." While an
employer cannot discriminate against qualified disabled individ-
uals,2" an individual with a disability is not qualified for a job
if that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
others in the workplace and such threat cannot be eliminated by
reasonable accommodations." Is John a qualified person with
a disability, thereby protected under the ADA? Here it is not
contended that John poses a threat to others, but that he poses
a threat to himself.
The EEOC's Title I regulations have expanded the Title I
safety defense by providing that a individual with a disability is
not qualified for a job if that individual poses a direct threat to
' Presumably, if John were precluded from working as a lawyer in any
capacity (as opposed to being precluded from working as a litigation attorney),
the class of job(s) from which John was excluded would be sufficiently broad
to render John substantially limited in his ability to work.
24 Telephone conversations between the author and EEOC attorneys.
2 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1991).
26 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b).
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the individual's own safety, as well as to the safety of others."
Since this regulation exceeds the express language of the Act,
an early challenge as to the validity of this regulation is virtual-
ly certain.
From a policy perspective, the regulation should be invalid.
A basic premise of the ADA is to eliminate "overprotective rules
and policies" that have the effect of discriminating against
persons with disabilities.' The legislative history of the Act is
replete with statements evidencing congressional intent to
prohibit paternalistic attitudes and actions that serve to remove
people with disabilities from the mainstream of society.29
Allowing employers to refuse to hire an individual with a
disability because his disability would cause a threat to the
individual's health or safety could encourage the very type of
paternalistic attitudes that the ADA is intended to eradicate.
Shouldn't John be able to decide for himself whether he wishes
to continue to play hockey?
Doctrinally, the EEOC's paternalistic safety regulations
arguably contravene legal principles recently expressed by the
Supreme Court examining provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.30 These provisions are the basis for the enforce-
ment section of Title I of the ADA."' In United Automobile
Workers of America v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,3 2 the Supreme
Court considered Johnson's policy barring all fertile women from
jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure that exceeded
standards set by the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration. The Court found that sex-specific fetal protection
policies violated Title VII's prohibition against discrimination on
the basis of sex or race.
27 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2).
28 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (Supp. II 1991).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 5, at 41 ("The discriminatory
nature of policies and practices that exclude and segregate disabled people has
been obscured by the unchallenged equation of disability with incapacity and
by the gloss of 'good intentions'.") (quoting testimony of Arlene Mayerson
before House Subcommittees on Select Education and Employment Opportuni-
ties), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 323; H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra
note 5, at 56 ("The determination that an individual with a disability will pose
a safety threat to others... must not be based on ... patronizing atti-
tudes ... ."), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 338.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) to 2000(e)-17 (1988).
31 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. 1 1991).
32 111 S.Ct. 1196 (1991).
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Title VII permits an employer to discriminate on the basis
of sex in "those certain instances" where sex "is a bona fide
occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of [the employer's] particular business or
enterprise.""3 Johnson claimed that its fetal protection policy
fell within a judicially recognized "safety exception" to the
BFOQ test.34 The Court disagreed. The Court held that the
safety exception "is limited to instances in which sex or preg-
nancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to perform
the job."3 For similar reasons, the Court held that Johnson's
policy did not meet the criteria of the BFOQ test. Under that
test an employer may only make distinctions based on gender
when such distinctions "relate to ability to perform the job. 36
The enforcement powers of Title I of the ADA are premised
on, and patterned after, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Title I provides that the powers, remedies, and procedures set
forth in Title VII are available under Title L" If the BFOQ
and safety defenses under Title VII apply only to instances in
which an employee's sex actually interferes with the employee's
ability to perform the job, the safety defense under Title I of the
ADA (except as otherwise provided in the ADA itself) should
similarly be held to apply only to those instances in which an
employee's disability actually interferes with the employee's
ability to perform the job.
In Johnson Controls, the Court also addressed the concern
that Johnson Controls might be exposed to greater tort liability
for potential injury to a fetus. The majority noted that if the
law precludes policies that discriminate on the basis of a pro-
tected category, the employer fully informs employees of any
risk, and the employer acts in a non-negligent fashion, a court
would have a remote basis for finding tort liability. The same
should be true under Title I of the ADA. If an employer abides
by Title I's nondiscrimination mandate, complies with all safety
regulations applicable to the employer's business, informs
disabled employees of potential risks to their safety, and acts in
a non-negligent fashion, a court should not hold the employer
liable in tort if a disabled employee is injured on the job.
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
34 il S.Ct at 1205.
35 Id. at 1206.
36 Id.
3 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. II 1991).
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Congress intended that the ADA "provide civil rights protec-
tions for persons with disabilities that are parallel to those
available to minorities and women, '38 incorporating by refer-
ence rights and remedies afforded women and minorities under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."9 For this reason,
Congress rejected an amendment to the ADA offered by Con-
gressman Sensenbrenner that would have denied disabled
people the protections given to minority groups under revisions
to Title VII proposed in the Civil Rights Act of 1990 - protec-
tions such as the right to damages for employment discrimina-
tion.40 Under Title VII, an employer may not refuse to hire a
female applicant based on the belief that a job poses a risk to
the safety of the woman, unless the woman is unable to perform
the job. It should be equally impermissible for an employer to
refuse to hire a disabled applicant based on the belief that a job
poses a risk to the safety of a person with a disability, unless
that individual was unable to perform the job. Such paternalis-
tic attitudes are implicitly prohibited by the ADA.
Assuming, arguendo, that the EEOC's safety defense regu-
lation is upheld, the question becomes whether Kathy's decision
to fire John falls within that defense. The regulations define a
"direct threat" to the health or safety of the disabled individual
or others as "a significant risk of substantial harm.., that
cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommoda-
tion."'41 A significant risk is defined as one that causes a "high
probability of substantial harm."42 An employer determining
whether a particular individual's disability would cause a high
probability of substantial harm to the individual or others must
consider such factors as:
(1) The duration of the risk;
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
9 H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 17, at 48, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 471.
39 H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 5, at 151, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.-
C.A.N. 303, 434; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. II 1991).
40 See 136 CONG. REC. H2611-23 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (Senate discus-
sion of, vote on, and rejection of the Sensenbrenner Amendment to the ADA).
41 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
' 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r).
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(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur;
and
(4) The imminence of the potential harm. 3
This assessment must be "strictly based" on objective
evidence, including valid medical analyses and individualized
factual data." A "safety risk" determination must be based on
evidence of a specific risk to John. The ADA rejects the broad
notion that the fact that a particular disability may pose a
statistically significant risk of harm is sufficient ground to hold
the safety defense satisfied.4"
Arguably, the safety defense is satisfied in this situation.
The risk of injury to John's remaining kidney occurs immediate-
ly upon his playing hockey and will last for as long as he contin-
ues to play. The severity of the potential harm is great - it
could lead to John's death. And, a specific risk of harm is at
issue. John's strongest argument is that the potential harm is
not "likely" to occur and thus the risk is not "significant." This
is a factual determination to be left to the courts. The medical
probabilities are too uncertain to predict a court's conclusion. If
the court were to uphold the employer's decision, however, the
result would be to deny John the right to make fundamental
choices about his own life that non-disabled people, such as
fertile or pregnant women, have the unequivocal right to make
for themselves.
C. EMPLOYER'S OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE
ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT
The last issue raised by this hypothetical is the obligation
of the employer to provide another position. Assuming that
John is held to be disabled, and that his employer's decision to
terminate his employment as a hockey player is upheld as a
non-discriminatory exercise of the safety defense, what is the
employer's obligation to place John in another job? Is any such
43 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). This regulation simply codifies the standard set
forth by the Supreme Court for dealing with the safety defense under § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. See School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 287-88 (1987).
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r).
"See generally, H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 5, at 57, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 339.
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obligation satisfied by Kathy's offer to hire John as an assistant
coach?
The EEOC's Title I regulations list "reassignment to a
vacant position" as a possible accommodation that might be
made for an employee who is unable to perform the employee's
current position due to a disability.46 Such reassignment
should be to an "equivalent position," in terms of pay and
status, if such a position is vacant or will become vacant "within
a reasonable amount of time."'7 An employer need not create
a job, nor bump another employee from a job, to accommodate
an employee with a disability. When an equivalent position is
not available, the employer may reassign an employee to a
lower graded position 8 at a lower salary. According to the
regulations, an employer is not required to promote an individu-
al with a disability as an accommodation.49
Under the regulations, Kathy probably complied with the
ADA by offering to "reassign" John to the position of assistant
coach. Presumably, no "equivalent jobs" were available for
which John was qualified. Even if the position of head coach
were available, it is unlikely that John would be qualified given
his lack of prior coaching experience.
III. CONNECTING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
TO PERSONAL NEEDS
Susan Jones is a quadriplegic, paralyzed below the shoulder
level. A large Wall Street law firm, Katsiff, Goldman & Troisi,
hired her as a telephone operator. As a reasonable accommoda-
tion the firm purchased voice activated computer equipment
that will allow Susan to perform the duties of her position. Due
to her disability, Susan requires assistance during the work day
with toileting and eating. As a further accommodation Susan
requests that the law firm provide an employee to assist Susan
with those tasks. The law firm refuses to do so. Susan files
suit under the ADA.
The ADA mandates that employers provide "reasonable
accommodations" that make it possible for an employee with a
46 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii).
" 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
48 Id.
49Id.
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disability to perform the employee's job.5" This hypothetical
raises the question of the scope of reasonable accommodations
required under Title I. To what length must employers go to
assist employees with disabilities? Is Katsiff, Goldman & Troisi
required to provide Susan with someone who can assist with her
personal needs during the work day?
What constitutes a "reasonable accommodation" in any
given case will not always be clear. The ADA and the EEOC
regulations anticipate common situations and list suggested
accommodations. 5 That list is intended to provide guidance as
to what is meant by a reasonable accommodation. Susan's
request is not among the accommodations listed. The regula-
tions, however, make clear that the list is not all-inclusive and
that "[t]here are any number of other specific accommodations
that may be appropriate for particular situations but are not
specifically mentioned in [the] listing.'"52
The interpretive guidelines to the regulations only briefly
address the issue of personal assistants. The guidelines note
that in addition to the regulatory list of suggested reasonable
accommodations, "[p]roviding personal assistants, such as a
page turner for an employee with no hands or a travel atten-
dant to act as a sighted guide to assist a blind employee on
occasional business trips, may also be a reasonable accommoda-
tion."53 The explanatory section to the regulations notes that
the interpretive guidelines "make clear that it may be a reason-
able accommodation to provide personal assistants to help with
specified duties related to the job."' Yet, toileting and eating
are not specified duties related to the job, so the regulations do
not specifically address Susan's needs.
50 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (Supp. II 1991).
" The regulations suggest that, in appropriate situations, the following
accommodations might be reasonable: (1) making existing facilities readily
accessible to and usable by people with disabilities; (2) job restructuring (by
reallocating or redistributing non-essential job functions); (3) development of
part-time or modified work schedules; (4) reassignment to a vacant position
(when accommodation within an employee's current job cannot satisfactorily
be made); (5) acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; (6) modifi-
cation or adjustment of examinations, training materials or policies; and (7)
provision of qualified readers or interpreters for blind or deaf employees. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2); See also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B) (Supp. II 1991).
52 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
53 Id.
'456 Fed. Reg. 35,728 (1991).
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Arguably, because the EEOC specified assistance with job-
related duties, providing personal attendants for non-job-related
duties would exceed the reasonable accommodation require-
ment. The more logical conclusion, however, is that this ques-
tion must be decided on a case-by-case basis, in accord with the
statutory and regulatory factors for determining whether a
requested accommodation constitutes an undue hardship to the
employer. The ADA focuses on an individualized inquiry to
determine whether a requested accommodation is reasonable.
Resolution of Susan's case should hinge on whether it would
constitute an undue hardship for Katsiff, Goldman & Troisi to
provide her with the personal assistance she requires. If the
firm has to hire another full-time employee just to assist Susan,
that might well constitute undue hardship. But, perhaps the
firm could accommodate Susan by having another employee
(e.g., another telephone operator, a secretary, or a clerk) perform
those tasks for a relatively small increase in salary. If that
alternative is unsuitable and if it is determined that hiring a
full-time personal assistant constitutes an undue hardship55 to
the firm, the firm and Susan might agree to share the cost of an
attendant. The firm is required to pay that portion of the
attendant's salary that would not constitute an undue hardship;
Susan could choose to pay the remainder. An employer is only
excused from providing that portion of an accommodation that
would constitute an undue hardship. 6
IV. CONSTRUCTING THE UNDUE HARDSHIP DEFENSE
Ginny Johnson, who uses a wheelchair, works for a con-
struction company. She applies for a transfer to serve as a site
manager for a three block project the company is building and
requests that the construction site be made wheelchair accessi-
ble. The construction company refuses to do so claiming that
such an accommodation would constitute an undue hardship.
The company argues that since the terrain and structure of the
site will be constantly changing as construction progresses,
structures to permit wheelchair access would have to be contin-
ually rebuilt. Ginny sues under the ADA.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10), 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. 111991); 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.15(d); See also discussion infra part V.
'6 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p).
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The issue involves the scope of the "undue hardship" de-
fense under Title L57 Ginny contends that the company can
afford the cost of making the construction site accessible; there-
fore, the undue hardship test is not satisfied. The company
argues that requiring continuing alterations to ensure that the
site is wheelchair accessible would constitute a fundamental
alteration in the nature of a temporary construction site.
The ADA sets forth four criteria to determine whether an
accommodation constitutes an undue hardship:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation need-
ed ... ;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or
facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable
accommodation; the number of persons employed at
such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or
the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered
entity; the overall size of the business of a covered
entity with respect to the number of its employees; the
number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered
entity, including the composition, structure, and func-
tions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic
separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of
the facility or facilities in question to the covered enti-
ty.
58
The ADA does not specifically provide a separate "funda-
mental alteration" defense to the provision of reasonable accom-
modations. However, the Supreme Court found that this type
of defense was incorporated under similar language in Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.59 Under that defense, an accom-
modation is not reasonable if it would require an employer to
fundamentally alter its business or program. Arguably, the
statutory instruction to consider "the impact otherwise of such
57 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10), 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1991), 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.15(d).
0 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (Supp. 1 1991).
59 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988); See Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979).
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accommodation upon the operation of the facility"6 reflects the
same principle. Moreover, the EEOC's Title I regulations add a
fifth factor to be considered when deciding whether an accom-
modation would constitute an undue hardship to the employer:
"[t]he impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the
facility, including the impact on the ability of other employees
to perform their duties and the impact on the facility's ability to
conduct business."
6
'
1
The EEOC interprets these five factors as creating a "finda-
mental alteration" defense.62 Thus, the interpretive guidelines
to the regulations provide that "the concept of undue hardship
is not limited to financial difficulty... [but] refers to any
accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, substan-
tial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature
or operation of the business."'
This interpretation is consistent with the legislative history
of the Act." In accord with this principle, the undue hardship
test should be satisfied in our hypothetical, since maintaining
wheelchair access would fundamentally alter the nature of a
temporary construction site. This is a temporary site, to which
permanent alterations cannot be made.'
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(ii) (Supp. II 1991).
61 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v). The regulations make clear, however, that,
with respect to the impact on other employees, an employer could not demon-
strate undue hardship by showing that the provision of the accommodation
would have a negative impact on the morale of other employees; rather, the
impact must be on the ability of other employees to perform their job duties.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d).
62 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p).
6 Id.
" See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 5, at 67 (1990) reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C-.AN. 303,349 ("undue hardship" means "an action that is unduly
costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that will fundamentally alter the
nature of the program"); See also S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 35
(1989).
m See, e.g., 112 CONG. REC. S10,735-36 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1985) (state-
ment of Sen. Harldn); See also EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMM'N,
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR THE AMEICANs wrrIH DISABILITIES ACT,
§ 8.4 (1992) [hereinafter MANUAL].
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V. INVESTIGATING "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED"
Tom Rogers is a rehabilitated drug abuser. He has not
used drugs for five years. During his period of drug use, he was
convicted on two charges of illegal narcotics possession. Tom
applies for a job as a campus police officer at Utopia University
and is rejected because a University policy precludes hiring as
police officers people who have been convicted of a crime. Tom
files suit under the ADA. Tom contends that as a rehabilitated
drug abuser he is covered by the Act and that the University's
policy impermissibly discriminates against him.
Tom clearly meets the threshold test and is considered a
disabled individual under the ADA. The Act expressly provides
that rehabilitated drug abusers are protected from employment
discrimination on the basis of that disability.66 However, Title
I only protects "otherwise qualified" individuals with disabili-
ties.67 Thus, the question: Is Tom otherwise qualified to be a
campus police officer?
An individual with a disability is not otherwise qualified for
a job unless he or she satisfies the personal and professional
attributes of the job. These attributes include the requisite
"skill, experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other
requirements .... ,,6 As a prerequisite for a job as a Utopia
University police officer, an applicant must have no criminal
convictions. While this policy has a discriminatory effect on
rehabilitated drug addicts, it does not violate the ADA if, and
only if, the selection criteria is "Job-related" and "consistent with
business necessity. '"69  The requirement that police officers,
who are hired to enforce the law, must themselves have re-
frained from criminal activity (so that, for example, their own
credibility is not suspect or subject to impeachment) is likely to
be held job-related and consistent with business necessity. Tom
should not be found otherwise qualified for the job and, there-
fore, should lose his suit.
A more troubling scenario is a University policy that simply
prohibits former drug abusers from serving as police officers
66 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(1),(2) (Supp. II 1991); See also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.3(b)(1),(2).
67 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 (b)(5)(A),(B) (Supp. II 1991).
68 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q).
69 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10.
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regardless of whether they have been convicted of a crime.
Since former drug addiction is a protected status under the
ADA, the University may have violated the ADA by discriminat-
ing solely on that status.
Imagine another applicant, Joyce Burns, who is also a
rehabilitated drug abuser. She became addicted to prescription
drugs taken for an injury. Joyce never abused illegal drugs, yet
she was a drug abuser. Under this version of the University's
policy, Joyce could not obtain a job as a police officer. Assuming
that Joyce is otherwise qualified for the job, the University's
refusal to waive its policy appears to violate Title I of the ADA.
Just as Title I precludes the University from refusing to hire
recovered alcoholics as police officers, 0 it should preclude
Utopia from refusing to hire persons who were formerly addict-
ed to legal drugs while under medical supervision.
If, however, the University's policy precluded hiring police
officers who were formerly addicted to illegal drugs, or who
were formerly addicted to legal drugs listed as "controlled
substances" - taken illegally without prescription and absent
supervision of medical care personnel 1 - the situation is more
akin to our initial hypothetical where Tom was denied employ-
ment based on prior criminal convictions. Although refusal to
hire is not premised on conviction of a crime in this instance, it
is premised on past illegal activity, an ethical issue that bears
directly upon the integrity of the University's police department.
The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual For The Americans
With Disabilities Act notes that a law enforcement agency might
be able to show that prohibiting persons with a history of illegal
drug abuse from serving as police officers satisfies the business
necessity test because, "such illegal conduct would undermine
the credibility of the officer as a witness for the prosecution in
a criminal case."' 2  However, as the EEOC points out, the
70 Interestingly, Title I prohibits an employer from refusing to hire an
alcoholic who currently uses alcohol, if the employee is able to perform the
essential functions of the job despite his or her alcoholism. See MANUAL,
supra note 65, § 3.9.
71 Illegal drug abusers under the ADA are those who use, possess or
distribute drugs that are unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act, 21
U.S.C. § 812 (1988). 42 U.S.C. § 12210(d) (Supp. II 1991). The Controlled
Substances Act makes it unlawful to use illegal drugs or to illegally use
prescription drugs that are "controlled substances" by virtue of their potential
for abuse.
72 MANUAL, supra note 65, § 8.7.
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business necessity test might not be satisfied if an applicant
with a history of illegal drug abuse "could demonstrate an
extensive period of successful performance as a police officer
since the time of drug use.""3
VI. ESSENTIALLY FUNCTIONING AT HOME
Ann Thomas has been a computer programmer with Ursa
Corporation for three years. The company has two thousand
employees at the facility where Ann works, including twenty-
five programmers. Two years ago Ann was diagnosed as having
multiple sclerosis. Her illness has progressed and she can no
longer commute to work without endangering her health. After
providing Ursa Corporation with medical documentation of her
need to work at home, Ann requests that the company install a
computer in her house and allow her to work at home. The
company refuses. Ann files suit under the ADA.
Ursa's policy requires that all employees work in the office.
The company wants its workers in one place, where they can
engage in face-to-face contact with supervisors and co-workers,
where they may be easily reached for spontaneous communica-
tion, and where they are part of the "work community."
Ann contends that the company objectives do not require an
inflexible worksite policy. At home, she could easily be reached
by telephone and via notes sent by a messenger who would
transport Ann's work to and from her home. Her communica-
tion with supervisors has been minimal and has primarily
involved the delivery of work assignments and the receipt of
completed work. She has had little communication with co-
workers to date. Finally, her workload can be monitored just as
easily if she works at home. The evidence supports Ann's
contentions.
At issue is whether Ann is still qualified for her job now
that she can no longer come to the office. Does the ADA require
employers to accommodate employees to this extent? If Ann
were a prospective employee who was applying for a job with
Ursa Corporation would she be found "otherwise qualified" for
the job if she could not satisfy the attendance requirements of
the position? Presumably, the employer would have the same
obligations with respect to this issue whether Ann were a new
or old employee.
73 Id.
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Under Title I, Ann is only otherwise qualified for the job if
she is able to perform the job's "essential functions. '7 4 Wheth-
er Ann is otherwise qualified, therefore, depends on whether
attendance at the office is an essential function of her job. The
term "essential functions" is defined in the EEOC's Title I
regulations as "job tasks that are fundamental and not margin-
al."" The legislative history of the ADA explains that the
term "essential functions" refers only to tasks to be performed
and not to the manner in which they are performed. The House
Judiciary Report explains that in a job requiring the use of
computers, "the essential function is the ability to access, input,
and retrieve information from the computer.""6 Thus, it is not
essential that people be able to visually read the screen or use
their hands to type on the keyboard if adaptive equipment is
available to allow people with impaired vision or no arms to
control the computer and access information.77 In accord with
this reasoning, it is arguable that Ann can perform the essential
functions of her job as a computer programmer regardless of
whether she works at home or at the office. Is this a satisfacto-
ry resolution of the matter?
At least two courts have considered Rehabilitation Act
claims dealing with employee requests to be allowed to work at
home. In Koffler v. Hahnemann University,7" a medical school
professor, whose job also entailed administrative responsibili-
ties, was precluded by his disability from being present on
campus on a regular basis. Dr. Koffler, however, could be
present on campus to teach and supervise research. He request-
ed that the university accommodate him by eliminating the
alleged ten percent of his job duties that he would be unable to
perform due to his absence from campus. Since Dr. Koffier was
not able to satisfy the administrative portion of the job require-
ment due to his absence, the court held that he could not per-
form the essential tasks of his job if he was not present on
campus.79
74 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. II 1991).
75 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
76 H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 17, at 33 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 456.
7 7 
Id.
78 No. 85-5189 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
79 Id.
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In Langon v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Servic-
es, a computer program analyst became, like Ann, unable to
commute to her job and requested that her employer allow her
to work at home. The district court held that the plaintiff had
not provided adequate medical documentation of the need to
work at home and, therefore, had not established the need for
the requested accommodation. On appeal, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that the district court erroneously granted
summary judgment in favor of the employer. The court re-
manded the case holding that factual disputes existed as to: (1)
whether the plaintiff had provided her employer with sufficient
information about her disability to invoke the employer's exist-
ing work-at-home policy; (2) whether the plaintiff could perform
her job at home; and (3) whether allowing the plaintiff to work
at home would impose an undue hardship on the employer."'
Neither of these cases helps our analysis. In our hypotheti-
cal situation, Ann is able to perform all of her current job tasks
at home, she has established the medical necessity to work at
home, and her employer has no existing work-at-home policy.
And, nothing in the EEOC regulations dealing with "essential
functions" reveals whether attendance at the office is, in and of
itself, an essential function of the job.
An alternative analysis of the issue may be to investigate
whether it would constitute an undue burden on the company to
allow Ann to work at home. Assuming minimal expense and
administrative effort in providing the accommodation, so that no
undue hardship results, would it constitute a fundamental
alteration of the company's program to allow Ann to work at
home? In the context of one employee, a credible argument can
be made that it would not.
Neither the "undue hardship" nor "essential function"
defenses of the ADA appear to be directly on point in this
situation. While solid arguments can be mustered for the
proposition that neither defense would apply in Ann's case,
whether the ADA should be interpreted to compel an employer
to eliminate the requirement that employees be present at the
workplace is questionable. It seems likely that courts would
' 749 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990), affd in part and rev'd in part, 959 F.2d
1053 (D.C. Cir. March 31, 1992) (affirming judgment that claim that
Department's failure to accommodate which led to denial of promotion request
and ultimate termination did not constitute a separate violation of Rehabilita-
tion Act).
8 Langon, 959 F.2d 1053.
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stretch the regulatory language and hold either that attendance
at the workplace was an essential function of the job or that it
would constitute a fundamental alteration of the company's
business to require it to allow Ann to work at home.
CONCLUSION
The six hypotheticals presented in this article illustrate
some of the "hard cases" that are likely to arise under Title I of
the ADA. Cases will frequently involve important policy ques-
tions, as well as factual questions, that cannot necessarily be
resolved by looking to the EEOC's regulations. It will be inter-
esting to watch as the courts wander through the Title I regula-
tory maze and try to interpret the regulations in accord with the
spirit and purpose of the ADA.

